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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines how Malaysian public listed firms with low and high corporate 
values use debt maturity as a tool to mitigate underinvestment problem. This study 
employs panel data methodology instead of the commonly used pooling regression. 
Results show that firms with low Tobin's Q ratio, a proxy for corporate value, maintain 
lower level of long-term debt to mitigate agency costs of debt caused by underinvestment 
problem, whereas firms with high Tobin's Q ratio are indifferent with the debt maturity 
decision. This study extends the literature on the determinants of debt maturity structure 
by highlighting the importance of recognising the firms by the corporate values in 
relation to the underinvestment problem. The findings also provide additional 
justification for the existing literature in explaining the negative relationship between 
agency costs of debt and debt maturity structure using a sample of firms from a 
developing market.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Studies on capital structure have placed more emphasis on various attributes of 
debt instead of the conventional debt-equity choice (Johnson, 2003). When a firm 
decides to finance its operations and growth opportunities with debt, the firm has 
to decide on the maturity of debt (short-term versus long-term debt), types of 
debt, and the sources of debt because each of these decisions can affect the firm's 
value. Different debt maturity has different advantages and shortcomings. For 
example, firms use long-term debt to mitigate agency costs of equity or 
overinvestment problem (Hart & Moore, 1998; Harvey, Lins & Roper, 2004; 
Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990) and/or to mitigate the risks related to short-term debt 
such as interest rate, liquidity and refinancing risks (Diamond, 1991; Sharpe, 
1991), but long-term debt is costly and subject to restrictive covenants for years. 
 
On the other hand, firms with greater growth opportunities face greater 
underinvestment problem that would lead to suboptimal investment decisions. 
Underinvestment occurs when shareholders reject value enhancing investment 
opportunities if the benefits of accepting these projects accrue mostly to 
debtholders instead of shareholders' wealth (Myers, 1984), which leads to higher 
agency costs of debt. Therefore, firms are found to use less long-term debt but 
more short-term debt to mitigate the underinvestment problem (Barnea, Haugen, 
& Senbet, 1980; Custódio, Ferreira, & Laureano, 2013; Myers, 1977). However, 
this raises a question as to whether the negative relationship between debt 
maturity and underinvestment problem holds for firms with low and high 
corporate values.  
 
Low corporate value firms are defined as firms with Tobin's Q less than 
one. These firms are considered as poorly managed firms, in which the growth 
opportunities are either not recognised by the outside investors or are 
insufficiently valuable to overcome the effect of debt overhang problem 
(Diamond & He, 2014; Lang, Ofek, & Stulz, 1996). Conversely, high corporate 
value firms have Tobin's Q ratio greater than one. These firms are perceived by 
the markets to be well managed and have good future growth opportunities, 
hence would not have problem raising external debt financing (Lang et al., 1996).  
 
Existing evidence on firms' debt maturity are mainly generated from the 
developed markets such as the US. Limited research works are found to examine 
debt maturity structure using evidence from the developing market, such as 
Malaysia. Firms in Malaysia are found to prefer bank borrowing and unlikely to 
use debt maturity as a tool to mitigate underinvestment problem given the close 
relationship with banks and highly concentrated ownership (Deesomsak, Paudyal, 
& Pescetto, 2009). Nonetheless, low corporate value firms may not have the 
close relationship with banks as compared to high corporate value firms. If this is 
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the case, debt maturity composition could be a significant tool to mitigate agency 
problems when low corporate value firms seek for alternative external debt 
financing. 
 
To answer the question, a sample of 612 non-financial Malaysian public 
listed firms with 7379 firm-year observations from 1995 to 2013 is split into two 
subsamples by the firms' Tobin's Q ratio, a measure for corporate value (Doukas, 
1995; McConnell & Servaes, 1995; Lang et al., 1996). For the full sample, 
agency cost is insignificant to explain the debt maturity structure of the firms. 
This evidence is consistent with Deesomsak et al. (2009). Nonetheless interesting 
results are reported when this study recognise the firms by the corporate values. 
Results show that agency cost of debt is negatively related to debt maturity for 
firms with Tobin's Q less than one. These firms prefer less long-term debt in the 
presence of underinvestment problem. However, the negative relationship does 
not hold for high Tobin's Q firms that are indifferent with debt maturity decision. 
Results remain consistent when the analysis controls for potential bias that may 
be driven by financial shocks. In addition, for robustness purpose the analysis is 
repeated to confirm that the findings are not driven by the identification of the 
subsamples. The full sample is split at the mean value of each firm's Q ratio over 
the observation period. Results are found to remain consistent, and therefore this 
study claims that low corporate value firms have greater incentives to use debt 
maturity than high corporate value firms, as a tool to mitigate underinvestment 
problem.  
 
This study identifies three important contributions. First, this study 
highlights the importance of recognising firms by the corporate values. By doing 
so, this study is able to provide additional justification beyond the neoclassical 
fundamentals to explain the negative relationship between debt maturity and 
agency costs of debt. Second, this study contributes to the theory of agency costs 
of debt and debt maturity literature related to the motivation to use debt maturity 
as a disciplining tool to mitigate underinvestment problem among low corporate 
value firms. Third, this study adds to the literature by providing empirical 
evidence from the perspective of a developing market. 
 
 
LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Firms can shorten the maturity of debt to mitigate underinvestment problem 
because short-term debt is considered a disciplining tool due to the need for 
frequent roll over (Barclay & Smith, 1995; Dennis, Nandy, & Sharpe, 2000; 
Guedes & Opler, 1996; Johnson, 2003; Myers, 1977; Ozkan, 2000). Firms are 
also found to shorten the maturity of debt to preserve future debt capacity if 
future growth opportunities are recognised sufficiently early (Aivazian, Ge, & 
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Qui, 2005a; Diamond & He, 2014). Moreover, trade-off theory argues that firms 
should use less long-term debt because growth opportunities that are considered 
as intangible assets cannot be used as collaterals for debt financing. In brief, 
empirical evidence shows that debt maturity is negatively related to growth 
opportunities (Barclay & Smith, 1995; Barclay, Marx, & Smith, 2003; Childs, 
Mauer, & Ott, 2005; Diomand & He, 2014; Guedes & Opler, 1996; Scherr & 
Hulburt, 2001). 
 
Firms' leverage are claimed to be influenced by private information on 
future growth (Diomand & He, 2014; Lang et al., 1996), but having many 
investment opportunities would financially constrained the firms specifically 
when the financing needs exceed the internal resources (Demirguc-Kunt & 
Maksimovic, 1998). As a result, underinvestment hypothesis states that these 
firms would end up rejecting value enhancing investment opportunities if the 
benefits of accepting these investment projects accrue mostly to the debtholders 
instead of the shareholders (Myers, 1977). Firms with greater growth 
opportunities face greater underinvestment problem, but firms are claimed to 
mitigate the problem by shortening the maturity of debt (Aivazian et al., 2005a). 
 
Mixed results are also reported. For example, Stohs and Mauer (1996) 
find that firms have little incentives to minimise agency costs of debt if the firms 
have relatively low levels of leverage. Debt maturity is found to be positively 
related to growth opportunities after controlling for firms' leverage. Scherr and 
Hulburt (2001), on the contrary, report little evidence between growth 
opportunities and debt maturity when the analysis controls for firm size. Similar 
results are reported by Deesomsak et al. (2009). No evidence is found to explain 
the effect of growth opportunities on debt maturity for firms in the Asia Pacific 
region. Firms are also reported to be unlikely to use debt maturity as an 
instrument to mitigate underinvestment problem (Deesomsak et al., 2009). 
 
Lang et al. (1996) further contend that the negative relationship between 
debt maturity and growth only holds for firms with low Tobin's Q ratio, but not 
for firms with high Tobin's Q. Based on Lang et al. (1996), a number of studies 
incorporate the heterogenous argument in examining the relationship between 
corporate debt financing and investment decisions (see for example, Aivazian et 
al., 2005a, 2005b; Dang, 2011). Accordingly, this study recognises the firms by 
their corporate values or the Q ratio to further examine the negative relationship 
between debt maturity and underinvestment problem.  
 
Low Tobin's Q firms are defined as firms with fewer investment 
opportunies and/or do not have valuable investment opportunities known to 
outside investors (Barclay & Smith, 1995; Lang et al., 1996; Myers, 1977). When 
future growth opportunities are not recognised by the market, investors are 
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doubtful as to whether additional fund that are raised to finance the firms 
investment projects would contribute positively to the shareholders' wealth. 
Investors are also concerned about the likelihood of managers wasting resources 
in these firms. To compensate the uncertainties, investors would require higher 
rate of return when investing in these firms. This also explains the increasing 
firms' cost of capital with leverage. Therefore, to mitigate these problems low 
Tobin's Q firms tend to use less long-term debt.  
 
H1: Low Tobin's Q firms maintain lower level of long-term debt 
to mitigate underinvestment problem. 
 
On the contrary, the growth opportunities of high Tobin's Q firms are less likely 
to cause underinvestment problem since the good investment opportunities are 
recognised by outside investors. As a result, these firms can always find external 
funding without worrying about the firms' balance sheet (Lang et al., 1996).  
 
H2: High Tobin's Q firms are indifferent between short-term and 
long-term debt. 
 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Sample Selection 
 
Sample consists of Malaysian firms publicly listed on the Main board of Bursa 
stock exchange. 144 firms in the financial industry are excluded from the sample 
selection due to the differences in the financial structure and regulation as 
compared to other industries (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Final sample is further 
reduced to 612 firms, with 7379 firm-year observations for the fiscal year 
covering from 1995 to 2013 after excluding all equity firms. Any firm-year 
observations with missing financial information are also excluded. Table 1 
reports the sample firms by industry groups based on the Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS) available at the Bloomberg database. 32.19% of 
the sample firms consist of industrial firms, followed by firms in the materials 
(19.12%) and consumer discretionary (18.30%) industries. 
 
To examine Hypotheses 1 and 2, the sample firms are divided into two 
subsamples. Subsample Tobin's Q < 1 consists of firms with Q ratio less than 
one, while subsample Tobin's Q > 1 includes of firms with Q ratio greater than 1. 
The concept of Tobin's Q is based on the argument that market value of a firm 
should approximately equal to the cost of replacing the firm's assets. Therefore, 
the Q ratio of a firm is measured by the firm's market value (market capitalisation 
+ liabilities + preferred equity + minority interest or non-controlling interest) 
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scaled by the total asset value or the replacement value of the firm's total assets. 
In general, poorly managed or a firm with low corporate value (undervalued) has 
an average Q ratio less than 1. Conversely, a well-managed or a high corporate 
value firm (overvalued) would have an average Q ratio greater than unity. 
 
Table 1 
Distribution of sample firms by industry groups 
 
Industry Number of Firms 
Percentage 
(%) 
Number of 
Observations 
Percentage 
(%) 
Industrials 197 32.19 2399 32.51 
Materials 117 19.12 1423 19.99 
Consumer Discretionary 112 18.30 1385 18.77 
Consumer Staples 77 12.58 958 12.98 
Information Technology 42 6.86 437 5.92 
Energy 22 3.59 210 2.85 
Health Care 14 2.29 150 2.03 
Utilities 9 1.47 59 0.80 
Telecommunication Services 5 0.82 211 2.86 
Others 17 2.78 147 1.99 
Total 612 100.00 7379 100.00 
 
Variables Selection 
 
The data for the identified variables are also collected from the Bloomberg 
database. Debt maturity is measured by long-term debt ratio scaled by total debt 
(Antoniou, Guney, & Paudyal, 2006; Barclay & Smith, 1995). Debt with maturity 
greater than a year is considered as long-term debt, whereas debt with maturity 
less than a year is considered as short-term debt.  
 
The market-to-book ratio (Agency cost) is a commonly used proxy for 
agency costs of debt, which measures the future growth opportunities of firms 
(Lang et al., 1996; Rauh & Sufi, 2010). Higher growth opportunities lead to 
higher agency costs (Myers, 1977). To mitigate the agency costs, firms tend to 
maintain less long-term, but more short-term debt (Barnea et al., 1980; Guedes & 
Opler, 1996; Johnson, 2003; Myers, 1977). Moreover, the negative relationship 
between agency costs and long-term debt is predicted to hold only for firms with 
low Tobin's Q, but not firms with high Tobin's Q (Lang et al., 1996). Therefore, 
undervalued firms (Tobin's Q < 1) are expected to have less long-term debt, 
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whereas overvalued firms (Tobin's Q > 1) are expected to be indifferent between 
short-term or long-term debt.  
 
Control variables such as business risk, firm size, tangibility, 
profitability, and tax proxy are also included to account for the effects of trade-
off theory and pecking order hypothesis on debt maturity structure. Business risk 
(Business risk) is measured as the standard deviation of earnings before interest 
and taxes (EBIT) scaled by total sales over four years. Trade-off theory argues 
that less risky or lower risk firms have the capacity to take up more debt to 
increase the firms' value and the opposite holds for risky firms. Risky firms use 
less long-term debt to decrease the probability of bankruptcy risk. Empirical 
studies find that less risky firms use long-term debt to finance their investment 
(Guedes & Opler, 1996; Stohs & Mauer, 1996) to take advantage of the tax shield 
on interest. Hence, an inverse relationship is expected between long-term debt 
and business risk.  
 
Firm size (Size) is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. The 
size of a firm is claimed to be positively related to debt maturity (Titman & 
Wessels, 1988; Stohs & Mauer, 1996). Large size firms tend to have lower 
degree of asymmetric information because large firms tend to be more 
established (Smith, 1977). In addition, firm size may measure the magnitude of 
financial distress. Large size firms are considered to have lower bankruptcy risk 
that enable these firms to tolerate higher levels of long-term debt financing 
(Chittenden, Hall, & Hutchison, 1996). Conversely, small size firms are found to 
prefer less long-term debt (Smith, 1977; Titman & Wessels, 1988). 
 
Tangibility is commonly measured by net fixed assets scaled by total 
assets. Tangible assets (Tangibility) are physical form of assets that can be used 
as collateral against external borrowing. Tangibility is found to be positively 
related to debt maturity structure (Fan, Titman, & Twite, 2012; Kirch & Terra, 
2012; Rauh & Sufi, 2010). Firms with higher tangibility have lower bankruptcy 
costs because more assets can be collateralised for borrowing in comparison to 
firms with lower tangible assets. Therefore, the former firms are expected to 
borrow more long-term debt. Moreover, for the emerging markets, tangible assets 
play an important role because the levels of collateralised assets determine if a 
firm has the capacity to borrow longer-term debt (Kirch & Terra, 2012).  
 
Profitability (Profitability) is measured by return on assets (ROA). 
Profitable firms are expected to utilise less debt (Rauh & Sufi, 2010) due to the 
informational asymmetry between managers and investors (Deesomsak et al., 
2009). Accordingly, firms would follow a financing hierarchy, in which retained 
earnings are the most preferred choice, followed by debt and equity. A negative 
relationship is expected between profitability and long-term debt. Tax proxy 
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(Tax) is measured as the income tax scaled by pre-tax income. Tax hypothesis 
suggests that leverage increases the value of the firm by reducing the taxable 
income. Brick and Ravid (1985), Kane, Marcus and McDonald (1985), and Stohs 
and Mauer (1996) argue that when firms use long-term debt, the saving from the 
present value of tax shield is accelerated from the increasing debt payment 
proportion allocated to long-term debt on an upward sloping yield curve in a 
healthy economy. For this reason, firms with high tax proxy are predicted to use 
more long-term debt.  
 
Methodology 
 
The dataset of this study have both cross sectional and time-series dimensions, 
thus it is more robust to employ panel data methodology (Akhtar, 2005). 
Hausman test is performed to determine either fixed or random effects panel 
regression better explained the dataset of this study. Results from Hausman test 
consistently support firm fixed effects over random effects. For brevity, only the 
estimates from fixed effects are reported in the following section. The firm fixed 
effects panel data regression is written as: 
 
i,t
0 1 i,t 2 i,t 3 i,t
i,t
4 i,t 5 i,t 6 i,t i i,t
Long term debt
β β  Agency cost β  Business risk β  Size
Total debt
β  Tangibility β  Profitability β  Tax γ ε
= + + + +
+ + + +
 
  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Long-term Debt and Agency Costs of Debt by Corporate Value 
 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics and mean difference of the identified 
variables for the full sample together with the subsamples. Overall, the sample 
firms are found to use less long-term debt but more short-term debt, which is 
consistent with previous studies (see for example, Barclay & Smith, 1995; 
Antoniou et al., 2006). On average, the sample firms maintain 36.43% of long-
term debt and 63.57% of short-term debt in the debt structure. Low corporate 
value firms are found to use less long-term debt (34.1%) but more short-term 
debt (65.9%) as compared to high corporate value firms that have 39.4% of long-
term debt and 60.6% of short-term debt in the debt structure. The difference is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The low Tobin's Q firms are shown to 
have lower agency costs of debt than the high Tobin's Q firms, which is also 
significantly different at the 1% level. In addition, the undervalued firms are 
found to have lower risk, smaller firm size, lower profitability, but higher 
tangibility and tax in comparison to the overvalued firms.  
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Table 2 
 Summary statistics and mean difference test 
 
Variables 
Full Sample Tobin's Q < 1 Tobin's Q > 1 (Tobin's Q < 1) – (Tobin's Q > 1) 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean Difference t-value 
Long-debt 
debt ratio 0.3643 0.3036 0.3410 0.2847 0.3940 0.3236 –0.0532
*** –7.3643 
Short-term 
debt ratio 0.6357 0.3036 0.6590 0.2847 0.6060 0.3236 0.0302
*** 7.3643 
Agency cost 1.2270 3.3503 0.5135 0.2279 2.1318 4.8924 –1.6183*** –18.8496 
Business risk 0.0930 1.2062 0.0656 0.1851 0.1279 1.8043 –0.0623** –1.9619 
Size 5.8560 1.4230 5.7164 1.1811 6.0331 1.6639 –0.3167*** –9.1845 
Tangibility 0.4121 0.2044 0.4169 0.2001 0.4059 0.2096 0.0110** 2.2792 
Profitability 0.0320 0.1094 0.0178 0.0724 0.0501 0.1412 –0.0323*** –11.8874 
Tax 0.1873 2.3854 0.2148 2.8741 0.1523 1.5587 0.0625 1.1919 
Number of 
Observations 7379 4126 3253 7379  
 
Note: *, ** or *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95% or 99% confidence levels, respectively. 
 
 Table 3 presents the correlation analysis of the explanatory variables. The 
analysis suggests that the selected variables do no suffer from multicollinearity 
problem. This finding is further confirmed using the variance inflation factor test 
(mean VIF = 1.01).  
 
Table 3 
Correlation matrix of the identified variables 
 
 
Agency 
cost 
Business 
risk Size Tangibility Profitability Tax 
Agency cost 1.0000      
Business risk 0.0023 1.0000     
Size 0.0141 –0.0078 1.0000    
Tangibility –0.0341*** –0.0105 0.0215* 1.0000   
Profitability 0.0273** –0.0321*** 0.1248*** –0.1035*** 1.0000  
Tax –0.0044 –0.0029 –0.0141 –0.0084 0.0122 1.0000 
 
Note: *, ** or *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95% or 99% confidence levels, respectively. 
 
The regression estimates that examine the effect of agency costs of debt 
on the long-term debt level are reported in Table 4. For the full sample, agency 
cost is reported to have insignificant effect on the level of long-term debt. This 
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finding is consistent with Deesomsak et al. (2009)'s study that find firms in 
Malaysia are unlikely to use debt maturity as a tool to mitigate underinvestment 
problem. Nonetheless, when this study recognises the sample firms by the 
corporate value, interesting results are reported. For subsample Tobin's Q < 1, 
agency cost is shown to have significant negative relationship with the level of 
long-term debt, at the 1% level. Supporting the theory of agency costs, these 
firms are found to decrease the level of long-term debt to mitigate 
underinvestment problem that growth firms are more likely to suffer (Myers, 
1977; Barclay & Smith, 1995; Childs et al., 2005; Diomand & He, 2014; Guedes 
& Opler, 1996; Dennis et al., 2000; Ozkan, 2000). 
 
Table 4 
Long-term debt and agency cost of debt by corporate value 
 
Variables 
Expected Sign 
Full Sample Tobin's Q < 1 Tobin's Q > 1 
Q < 1 Q > 1 
Agency cost – Indifferent –0.0012 –0.0705*** –0.0002 
 
  
(–1.40) (–3.94) (–0.22) 
Business risk – – –0.0083*** –0.0332* –0.0078*** 
 
  
(–3.63) (–1.71) (–3.16) 
Size + + 0.0923*** 0.0925*** 0.0952*** 
 
  
(17.57) (10.13) (12.39) 
Tangibility + + 0.2576*** 0.2832*** 0.1514*** 
 
  
(11.54) (9.56) (3.96) 
Profitability – – 0.1685*** 0.2961*** 0.0802** 
 
  
(6.12) (5.70) (2.25) 
Tax  + + 0.0013 0.0018 0.0003 
 
  
(1.18) (1.63) (0.10) 
Constant 
  
–0.2855*** –0.2729*** –0.2441*** 
 
  
(-8.51) (–4.87) (–4.73) 
Firm fixed effect   Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effect   Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect   Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 
  
0.1594 0.1022 0.2002 
Number of 
Observations   
7379 4126 3253 
 
Note: The t-values are reported in the parentheses. *, ** or *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95% or 99% 
confidence levels, respectively. 
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This is because low Tobin's Q firms suffer from investors' lack of 
confidence in the ability of these firms to invest in value added investment 
projects (Myers, 1977; Barclay & Smith, 1995; Lang et al., 1996). Since the 
growth opportunities of low Tobin's Q firms are not recognised by the capital 
markets, these firms have to tolerate increasing cost of capital as leverage 
increases (Lang et al., 1996). Therefore, to mitigate the problem these firms tend 
to use less long-term debt in the debt structure. The significant negative 
relationship between agency cost and long-term debt is therefore, supporting 
Hypothesis 1.  
 
On the contrary, for subsample Tobin's Q > 1 the agency cost variable is 
insignificant. High Tobin's Q firms are found to be indifferent with the debt 
maturity decision as conjectured in Hypothesis 2. When firms are known to the 
market to have good investment opportunities, these firms can always find 
external funding without worrying about the firms' balance sheet (Lang et al., 
1996). In other words, the growth opportunities of high Tobin's Q firms are less 
likely to cause underinvestment problem since the good investment opportunities 
are recognised by the outside investors.  
 
On the other hand, the firms' (full sample and subsamples) levels of long-
term debt are consistently and significantly affected by business risk, firm size, 
tangibility and profitability. Consistent with the trade-off theory, firms with 
higher level of business risk are found to maintain less long-term debt because of 
the increasing financial distress as the business risk increases. Furthermore, large 
firms are more likely to maintain higher level of long-term debt. This positive 
relationship also supports the trade-off theory. Large firms are more mature, well 
established and have lower level of asymmetric information (Smith, 1977) as 
well as bankruptcy risk that enable these firms to tolerate higher level of long-
term debt financing (Chittenden et al., 1996). 
 
The significant and positive coefficient of the tangibility variable is 
consistent with the expected sign. Firms with higher tangible assets are found to 
borrow more long-term debt because more assets can be used as collateral against 
the borrowing (Fan et al., 2012; Kirch & Terra, 2012), which also implies lower 
bankruptcy risk. However, the profitability variable loads positive. Though the 
reported positive relationship between profitability and long-term debt is 
inconsistent with the expected sign, the finding is still justifiable in accordance to 
the financing hierarchy argument of pecking order hypothesis. When profitable 
firms have insufficient or fully utilised their internal resources to finance their 
investment opportunities, these firms would seek external financing. Long-term 
debt would be the next preferred financing choice instead of equity, and hence 
explains the positive coefficient of profitability. 
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In addition, tax is found to be insignificant, which is inconsistent with 
previous studies. Previous studies argue that firms use long-term debt to benefit 
from the present value of tax shield and the savings is accelerated on an upward 
sloping yield curve (Brick & Ravid, 1985; Kane et al., 1985; Stohs & Mauer, 
1996), but it is not the case for Malaysia firms. Potentially, the insiginificant 
relationship can be explained by the low effective tax rate and flat yield curve in 
Malaysia. 
 
Robustness Check 
 
The analysis is repeated by excluding the financial crisis years of 1997 and 2008 
to control for any potential bias driven by the financial shocks. The number of 
observations of the full sample reduce to 6,643 firm-year observations. 
Subsample Tobin's Q < 1 and Tobin's Q > 1 have 3595 and 3048 firm-year 
observations, respectively. Results are reported in Table 5. The negative 
relationship between agency cost and long-term debt remains significant at the 
1% level for firms in subsample Tobin's Q < 1. On the other hand, firms in 
subsample Tobin's Q > 1 are indifferent with the debt maturity decision. These 
results  further support the arguments of Hypotheses 1 and 2. Moreover, the 
results of the control variables are found to be qualitatively similar to those 
reported in Table 4. 
 
Also for robustness purpose, the subsamples are re-categorised by the 
average Tobin's Q value of individual firm over the observation period to control 
for firms that have both observations in Tobin's Q < 1 and Tobin's Q > 1 during 
the sample period. A firm is considered as a low Tobin's Q firms if the average 
Tobin's Q over the observation period is less than one, and the opposite for high 
Tobin's Q firms. This method reduces the subsample size of Tobin's Q < 1 to 
1494 firm-year observations. But, subsample Tobin's Q > 1 now has 5888 firm-
year observations. Table 6 reports consistent results. Low Tobin's Q firms are 
found to maintain lower level of long-term debt when agency cost increases. 
Consistently, the negative coefficient of agency cost is significant at the 1% level, 
but the coefficient is found to be insignificant for the high Tobin's Q firms. High 
corporate value firms are indifferent with the debt maturity decision. Again, these 
results support the arguments of Hypotheses 1 and 2 of this study. 
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Table 5 
Excluding observations during financial shock (Year 1997 and 2008) 
 
Variables 
Expected Sign 
Full Sample Tobin's Q < 1 Tobin's Q > 1 
Q < 1 Q > 1 
Agency cost – Indifferent –0.0013 –0.0657*** –0.0004 
   (–1.48) (–3.31) (–0.40) 
Business risk – – –0.0080*** –0.0470** –0.0073** 
   (–2.62) (–2.39) (–2.22) 
Size + + 0.0913*** 0.0911*** 0.0928*** 
   (16.51) (9.02) (11.60) 
Tangibility + + 0.2594*** 0.2896*** 0.1518*** 
   (10.91) (9.02) (3.81) 
Profitability – – 0.1753*** 0.2944*** 0.0839** 
   (6.02) (5.30) (2.24) 
Tax + + 0.0014 0.0019* 0.0053 
   (1.20) (1.67) (1.31) 
Constant   –0.2824
*** –0.2714*** –0.2319*** 
   (–7.99) (–4.40) (–4.31) 
      
Firm fixed 
effect   Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effect   Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed 
effect   Yes Yes Yes 
      
R-squared   0.1629 0.1059 0.1993 
Number of 
Observations   6,643 3,595 3,048 
 
Note: The t-values are reported in the parentheses. *, ** or *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95% or 99% 
confidence levels, respectively. 
 
However business risk becomes insignificant for the low Tobin's Q firms, 
but is negatively related to long-term debt for the high Tobin's Q firms at the 1% 
level. Potentially, these results may suggest that the relative impact of agency 
cost outweighs the impact of business risk in affecting the levels of long-term 
debt among the low Tobin's Q firms. As for the high Tobin's Q firms, the 
negative impact on the levels of long-term debt is relatively driven by business 
risk instead of the firm's underinvestment problem. The results of the other 
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control variables are found to be qualitatively similar to the results reported in 
Table 4. 
 
Table 6 
Subsamples of firms by average Tobin's Q over the sample period (1995 to 2003) 
 
Variables 
Expected Sign 
Full Sample Tobin's Q < 1 Tobin's Q > 1 Q < 1 Q > 1 
Agency cost – Indifferent –0.0012 –0.0262*** –0.0008 
   (–1.40) (–4.39) (–0.85) 
Business risk – – –0.0083*** 0.0235 –0.0084*** 
   (–3.63) (0.68) (–3.59) 
Size + + 0.0923*** 0.0854*** 0.0927*** 
   (17.57) (5.94) (16.28) 
Tangibility + + 0.2576*** 0.2089*** 0.2697*** 
   (11.54) (4.24) (10.27) 
Profitability – – 0.1685*** 0.3334*** 0.1507*** 
   (6.12) (4.28) (5.07) 
Tax + + 0.0013 –0.0005 0.0027* 
   (1.18) (–0.32) (1.78) 
Constant   –0.2855
*** –0.2334*** –0.2891*** 
   (–8.51) (–2.71) (–7.83) 
Firm fixed 
effect   Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effect   Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed 
effect   Yes Yes Yes 
      
R-squared   0.1594 0.1212 0.1660 
Number of 
Observations   7379 1491 5888 
 
Note: The t-values are reported in the parentheses. *, ** or *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95% or 99% 
confidence levels, respectively. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The theory of agency costs argues that firms with high-growth opportunities tend 
to use less long-term debt, but more short term debt to mitigate underinvestment 
problem. In this study, the negative relationship is examined whether the 
relationship still holds if the firms are recognised by the corporate values that is 
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measured by the commonly used Tobin's Q. Using a sample of 612 Malaysia 
public listed firms, this study finds that low Tobin's Q firms  are likely to use less 
long-term debt to mitigate underinvestment problem. Potentially, the firms' 
corporate value either lack of market recognition or poorly managed, and thus 
increases the cost of debt. Contrary, the negative relationship does not hold for 
firms with Tobin's Q greater than one. These firms are found to be indifferent 
with the debt maturity decision. In addition, the control variables consistently 
provide significant evidence to support the agency costs and trade off theories. In 
brief, this study provides additional insight to determinants of debt maturity by 
highlighting the importance of recognising the heterogeneity of firms, in this case 
the corporate value in relation to the agency costs of debt. Evidence of this study 
also contributes to the literature from the developing market's perspective.  
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